Many machine learning classifiers are vulnerable to adversarial perturbations. An adversarial perturbation modifies an input to change the prediction of a classifier without causing the input to appear substantially different to the human perceptual system. We make progress on this AI Safety problem as it relates to image classification by training on images after a simple conversion to the YUV colorspace. We demonstrate that adversarial perturbations which modify YUV images are more conspicuous and less pathological than in RGB space. We then show how that whitening RGB images lets us visually see the difference fooling and benign images. Last we introduce a new saliency map to better understand misclassification.
Introduction
Images can undergo slight yet pathological modifications causing machine learning systems to misclassify, all while humans barely can notice these perturbations. These types of manipulated images are adversarial images [2] , and their existence demonstrates frailties in machine learning classifiers and a disconnect between human and computer vision.
This unexpected divide can allow attackers complete leverage over some deep learning systems. For example, adversarial images could cause a deep learning classifier to mistake handwritten digits, thereby fooling the classifier to misread the amount on a check [11, 6] . Other fooling data could evade malware detectors or spam filters that use a deep learning backend [3] . Worse, generating adversarial images requires no exact knowledge of the deep learning system in use, allowing attackers to achieve consistent control over various classification systems [14, 10] .
A consistently misclassified adversarial image is easy to generate. Say we want an image of a civilian x civilian to be misclassified as a soldier. Then given a neural network model M and a loss function L : X × Y → R, we can generate an image x fool by minimizing L M (x fool , y soldier ) + λ x civilian −x fool 2 2 using gradient descent to modify the image. We can stop performing gradient descent when P (y soldier |x fool , M) exceeds a specified threshold [2] . The result of this procedure is an adversarial image which is near indistinguishable to the adversarial image, yet it can reliably fool other deep learning models.
In this paper, we make progress on the AI Safety [8] subproblem of adversarial images and we contribute a new saliency map to allow for more interpretability of convolutional neural networks. In this work's first section, we simply convert training data to the YUV color space and train a convolutional neural network classifier on this data. This forces the adversarial image generation processes to make conspicuous modifications to the image in order to fool the network. That is, converting to YUV makes adversarial perturbations more visible and therefore limits their effectiveness. Building on this technique, we then demonstrate a new preprocessing method which makes the network more robust to adversarial images. Thereafter, we demonstrate that whitening fooling images makes adversarial perturbations visually obvious even for networks trained on RGB images. Last, because visualizing neural networks can provide for increased interpretability, predictability, and thereby safety, we present a new "convolution transpose" or "deconvolution" technique to visualize what image modifications would most affect the logits.
2 Neural Network Protection with YUV and 2 Pooling
YUV Conversion
We demonstrate that training a neural network on YUV images makes pathological perturbations visible, diminishing the harm of adversarial images. In this experiment we train a 32-layer residual network [4, 1] on images in the YUV color space, which is a color space that separates chrominance and luminance and is a linear transformation of the RGB color space. In order to fool this network, we use an iterative adversarial image generator which takes a clean image and randomly chooses a target label. We do not use the fast gradient sign method to generate fooling images because "iterative methods exploit much finer perturbations which do not destroy the image," as iterative methods prioritize pathology over speed [6] . Now, by gradient descent, the iterative image generator minimizes the loss and stops immediately when the network's confidence in the image is greater than 50%. The loss has a regularization penalty of λ = 10 −4 , and the fooler descends on this loss with a 5 × 10 −3 step size. We let the fooler generate adversarial images by modifying the YUV image directly. In Figure 1 , we observe that the resulting fooling images have perceptible perturbations, whereas previously they were unnoticeable. Moreover, since converting from RGB to YUV is not destructive to the image, this simple form of protection has no impact on accuracy [7] . In sum, a neural network trained on YUV images will correspond to "fooling" images which are visibly out-of-sample.
Greater Robustness with 2 Pooling
Although YUV adversarial images now have perceptible perturbations, we can force the adversarial image generator to make even more image alterations in its attempt to fool the network. This is possible by way of a simple preprocessing technique. To motivate our preprocessing technique, first recall our example of a model M being attacked so that it classifies a civilian image as a soldier. For simplicity, assume M is a logistic regression binary classifier with weights w and low outputs are classified as soldiers. Following the analysis of [2] , we add the noise ε to x civilian to obtain a fooling image x fool = x civilian + ε and decrease σ(w T x fool ) = σ(w T x civilian + w T ε). Then we need only let ε i = −a · sign w i , a a small positive factor, to increase the probability of classifying a civilian as a soldier. If w is n-dimensional with an average entry magnitude of m, then the impact of adding ε on the inner product is −amn. Consequently, minuscule perturbations have an outsized impact on the classification for high-dimensional inputs.
With that preliminary analysis aside, we can now motive our preprocessing technique. If the x fool 's entries are in [0, 1], then we could elementwise square the pixels of x fool without much loss of information. In effect, the noise ε must then decrease σ(w
T (x civilian ε) + w T ε 2 ), the elementwise product, and to accomplish this we need ε i = −a · sign [(x civilian ) i w i ]. Thus here ε must take on values which directly dissociate the original image and the weights rather than simply move in a direction opposite the weights. Because we elementwise squared the image, the adversarial noise may be forced to modify the image significantly if it is to fool the network. Another way to compel the adversarial noise to conspicuously alter the image is by slightly blurring the pixels. Doing so requires the adversarial perturbations coordinate spatially. Therefore, if we slightly blur the squared pixels and take the square root of the resulting image, we have 2 pooled the image without decreasing the dimension. The new pooled image pressures adversarial image generators to make spatially coordinated perturbations.
We combine the squaring and blurring ideas to arrive at a new pooling preprocesing technique. We first train a 32-layer Residual Network on YUV images where each dimension is rescaled to [0, 1]. We square the pixels, blur them with a Gaussian filter (µ = 0, σ = 0.7), and take the square root of this image. We feed this preprocessed image into the residual network trained on clean, rescaled YUV images. Further, we feed in the fooling image without this preprocessing and let the softmax probability for the loss be the average of these two softmaxes. That is, the loss uses the average of the two softmax probabilities. Now with this preprocessing, the adversarial images have an average 2 distance of 2.44 from the clean image; without this preprocessing, it is 1.75-a 40% increase. Therefore simple preprocessing further limits the effectiveness of adversarial image generators by compelling the fooler to make larger image modifications.
Visualizing Perturbations
Although training on YUV images makes fooling distortions conspicuous to the human eye, we can also visualize the previously invisible RGB image perturbations. We accomplish this by whitening a fooling image. Whitening is a preprocessing step sometimes utilized to train neural networks. It decorrelates image features, gives them equal variance, and therefore decreases redundant information. Using adversarial images from the 32-layer residual network trained on RGB images, we whiten the image and notice that fooling images are clearly distinct from typical whitened images, as is clear from Figure 2 . The effect is similar in for YUV images. Note that some suggest that the human eye also whitens visual inputs [9] , and neural networks may approximately whiten images too. Consequently, the whitened image may be a better indicator for what the neural network perceives, and now it is more visually obvious whether an image is a fooling or benign image.
A Saliency Map
Let us now stop considering adversarial images and turn to a different AI Safety goal. Another AI Safety goal is to make neural networks more interpretable. A common way to understand network misclassifications is through saliency maps. And a simple way to make a saliency map is by computing the gradient of the network's logits with respect to the input and backpropagating the error signal without modifying the weights. Then after the error signal traversed backward through the network, we can display the resulting gradient as an image and this shows us salient parts of the image. A recently proposed technique to improve saliency maps is guided backpropagation [13] . To understand guided backpropagation, let us establish some notation. Let f In the first column, the network classifies this desert scene as a lakeside. Our saliency map reveals the lightning may be interpreted as a wave crest, and the sunlit sky is the shore. Next, the fish construed as a water snake has a saliency map where the background resembles water, and the fish's scales are greener and more articulated. The clouds misclassified as a geyser is plausibly because the image center is considered the geyser's opening. Last, our saliency map makes it evident that the green water may lead to the shower curtain misclassification.
Original Image Positive Saliency Map (Ours) Negative Saliency Map (Ours) Figure 4 : Reasonably classified images can be better understood by the saliency map too. This scene is classified as a lake shore, and we see that making the shore bluer would most decrease the logits by considering the negative saliency map. Curiously, the sky texture from this saliency map consists of tiles.
Conclusion
In this work, we demonstrated that neural networks trained on YUV images can correspond to far less pathological adversarial examples. Future classifiers at risk of adversarial manipulation would then do well to simply train on YUV rather than RGB images to reduce the pathology of adversarial images. We also showed that whitening images makes adversarial perturbations visible, while previously they were nearly imperceptible. Furthermore, we contributed a new saliency map which allows us to better interpret the behavior of convolutional neural networks. Future work on the adversarial images AI Safety problem could include combining the YUV image conversion presented here with previous defenses against adversarial image attacks.
